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Abstract
In this paper, we introduce a game-theoretical non-cooperative model
of bargaining to analyse project funding in the French river basin com-
mittees. After sorting out some of the main theoretical predictions, we
proceed with an empirical application to the subsidy policy of French Wa-
ter Agencies. The theoretical model of bargaining is simulated for various
risk preferences, and a reduced-form estimation of the distribution of sub-
sidies is performed. We find some evidence in support of the predictions
regarding the role of bargaining in decision-making for water management.
1 Introduction
The main purpose of this paper is to analyse the decision-making process of two
major actors in the French water policy: the Water Agencies (hereafter, WA) and
the River Basin Committees (RBC). The general mission of WAs is to undertake
actions to protect water against any action which can deteriorate its quality and
quantity. To do so, WAs have two main financial instruments at their disposal.
First, they collect taxes on water users, based on a set of various parameters
and variables including the pollution levels resulting from the different activities.
Second, they use these tax revenues to finance various operations and projects.
In practice, the general mission of the WAs translates unto a set of practical
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objectives: contribute to reaching an adequate ecological state of river basin
resources, and to matching available water resources with water needs. This
includes several orientations (Adour-Garonne Water Agency, 2012):
• Improve the quality of drinking water
• Reduce the impact of human activities on aquatic ecosystems
• Maintain the natural processes of aquatic ecosystems
• Put water at the heart of land management policies
• Promote the quantitative management of river streams, in particular during
the summer
• Manage ground water resources in a sustainable manner.
Water users pay taxes but are also, more or less directly, the beneficiaries
of these projects. In what follows, we will mostly group the users into three
categories : the residential users, the industrial firms, and the farmers.
The French water policy relies upon the principle of decentralized management
of the water resource by river basin. The way tax revenues collected by a Water
Agency will be redistributed among the user categories is discussed within a River
Basin Committee. Consisting of elected members of local and parliamentary
chambers, of representatives of users and of the public administration, such a
Committee (one for each of the six major French river basins) is in charge of
elaborating the environmental objectives of the river basin, but also to agree
among its members upon the distribution of subsidies and the determination of
emission and use tax rates.
The fact that decisions on the Water Agency budget in terms of taxes and
subsidies are discussed by River Basin Committee members implies that a signif-
icant degree of discretion is expected. Many representatives are participating to
the Committees in order to obtain benefits for their sector (agriculture, industry,
local communities), while representatives of the regions or the State may have
preferences over a larger range of water users. We reproduce below some elements
of the debates that took place during the Adour-Garonne RBC of July 4, 2011.
These extracts indicate that indeed not all actors act in a complete consensual
way.
· Mr. Fre´de´ric Came´o-Ponz (representative of an environmental association):
“Concerning the issue of budget balancing, he approves of the limitation of tax
increases, but asks for a modification of its distribution across user categories, to
account for the polluter-pays principle”.”
· Mr. Robert Cabe (representative of a de´partement): “Moreover, while he
agrees with Mr. Claude Miqueu, representative of a de´partement on the need to
account for the opinion of local elected representatives, he points to the fact that it
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is necessary to make sure that such opinion corresponds effectively to the general
interest, and not to highly local ones, which would hamper reaching the objective
of the creation of water reservoirs”.
· Mr. Marcel Menier (representative of the industry) “reminds the Committee
about the cumulated increase of 43.5 percent in taxes paid by the industry until
2014, which will be a major financial burden to industrial firms. The industrial
sector will therefore pay a particular attention to the changes in environmental
tax rates along the 10th action programme”.
· Mr. Yves Casenove (representative of the industry) “notes in reaction to a
statement by Mr. Pierre Augey (representative of rural municipalities), that the
increase in taxes did not result from a consensus during the 9th programme, the
industrial sector being a strong opponent to this increase. He adds that a fair
comparison with other river basins must be extended to aspects of water require-
ments. Indeed, it is only with a global evaluation of subsidies and taxes that an
objective comparison across user categories can be achieved. Such procedure has
no other goal but to make sure the distribution of the budget is organized within
reasonable bounds, in order to make progress in the concertation”.
Our objective is to describe the negotiation process within River Basin Com-
mittees as a game where the actors will be the representatives of the different
categories of users. An important aspect when considering a model of bargaining
applied to water management decisions, is the fact that the latter may not reflect
the observed distribution of water user representatives in the RBCs. Indeed, a
representative of a given user category wishes to secure a minimum budget to
be allocated to his own group, in the form of subsidies. In practice however, the
representative may need to form a coalition with other representatives, to make
sure his proposal will be accepted. A major determinant is therefore the weight
each category has in the River Basin Committee, as well as the probability that a
particular representative will have the initiative to make or discuss any proposal
upon the budget to be distributed.
As for any game, we have to describe the strategies and the payoffs of the
various players. In terms of outcomes, we also have to explain the two main di-
mensions which have just been described. What is the total amount of tax which
is collected and how the tax burden is shared accross the different categories of
users? How this money is used and distributed accross the different recipients?
Who are the main beneficiaries of these operations? In Section 2, we describe the
institutional setting concerning the French Water Agencies and the River Basin
Committees, paying a particular attention to the distribution of representatives
in these committees. The sequential model of bargaining is presented in Section
3, starting with related literature on bargaining in institutions. We then describe
our game-theoretical approach, consisting in two stages: determination of the
optimal share of budget to be bargained upon, and computation of the optimal
pay-offs. We also provide some examples of the game, and show that in some
cases, the bargaining stage over the budget may not exist. The empirical applica-
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tion is presented in Section 4. We describe the data collected from French Water
Agencies on tax revenues and subsidies for various categories of water users, as
well as on River Basin Committees. In this section, we first conduct a simu-
lation experiment from the game-theoretical model calibrated on data from the
Adour-Garonne water Agency. We then present a brief reduced-form estimation
of the relationship between subsidy shares and the distribution of River Basin
Committee representatives. Section 5 is the conclusion.
2 Institutional Setting
The French Water Agencies have been created in 1966, following the first Wa-
ter Act of 1964, which institutionalized a decentralised water management sys-
tem at the hydrogeographical level of the river basin. This system has been
reinforced by the subsequent Water Acts of 1992 and 2006. The six Water
Agencies (Adour-Garonne, Artois-Picardie, Loire-Bretagne, Rhin-Meuse, Rhoˆne-
Me´diterrane´e-Corse and Seine-Normandie) are public establishments of admin-
istrative nature, under the supervision of two ministries: the Ministry of the
Environment and the Ministry of Finance. Water Agencies participate at each
river basin level to the national and European water policies, by developing a
strategy originating from an overall view of water issues. On behalf of the State
and the River Basin Committee, Water Agencies contribute to reaching a good
state of water bodies by reducing the impact of human activities, by preserving
water resources and by satisfying user needs through the search for an equilibrium
between water resources and rational water use.
2.1 Water Agencies and Economic Instruments
Water Agencies reach these objectives through financial operations, by design-
ing and developing framework plans for water management as planning tools
(SDAGE, Sche´ma Directeur d’Ame´nagement et de Gestion des Eaux) which are
translated into Policy Instrument Plans (Programmes de Mesures). Water Agen-
cies also have missions of information and dissemination to the public, and a
mission of decentralised cooperation (Oudin-Santini Law of 27 January 2005).
In practice, this means that Water Agencies are in charge of financing common-
interest or private projects dealing with water resources at the local level, and
that their budget is funded by a series of water charges associated with resource
conservation objectives (see Seroa da Motta et al., 2004; Thomas, 1995).
The total level of taxes collected by each Water Agency is determined in
line with the expenses of all nature which must be supported by the Agency,
in the framework of a multiyear intervention program approved by the Prime
Minister after a recommendation by the Inter-ministerial mission on water. Table
1 presents the tax revenues by WA and intervention program, with the proportion
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of taxes paid by agriculture and industry. As can be seen from the table, the
total budget has been reduced for the 8th multiyear intervention programme in all
WAs. The share of tax revenues from the agricultural sector is always very low,
ranging from 0.11 percent in Artois-Picardie during the 6th programme, to 7.95
percent for Adour-Garonne during the 9th programme. However, in a majority
of cases, the share of agriculture has been increasing. The share of tax revenues
from industry is much higher, and is generally decreasing in a significant way
over time. This implies that budget increases have been possible with a higher
contribution from the local communities over the multiyear programmes.
An important aspect of the current policy is the desire to promote a con-
sensus among stakeholders in preserving the environment while maintaining a
sustainable equilibrium between water availability and the user demands.
After the Water Act of 2006, new dispositions apply starting in 2007. The
French Parliament now determines the priority orientations of the multiyear inter-
vention programs of Water Agencies and determines the maximum level (ceiling)
of their expenses (budget). These new dispositions also stipulate that the deliber-
ations of the Executive Board of Water Agencies are taken after recommendation
from the River Basin Committee, and in compliance with the total multiyear
amount of expenses (budget), which is the object of a decree by the Ministry of
the Environment and the Ministry of the Budget.
Table 2 presents the total subsidies distributed by each WA and intervention
program, with the proportion of subsidies received by agriculture and industry.
It is interesting to note that the proportion of total subsidies for the agricultural
sector is highly heterogeneous across WAs, and across programmes for the same
Water Agency. Some WAs have experienced a sharp decrease in the proportion
of industrial subsidies, in particular Arois-Picardie and Seine-Normandie. This
reflects the changes in the priority of WAs over time, and the fact that in many
river basins, the number of conservation and resource management projects asso-
ciated with industry has been declining. At the same time, for some WAs, objec-
tives of reducing non point source pollution from agriculture have been up in the
agenda, because many river basins were lagging behind in this respect. Moreover,
some WAs in river basins where environmental pressures from agriculture are
more significant, as in Loire-Bretagne, have implemented pollution-management
programmes before other WAs, which may explain the relative decrease in the
proportion of subsidies to agriculture.
Water Agencies are in charge of the secretary of River Basin Committees.
They collect emission taxes according to the Polluter-Payer Principle and water
use taxes. They give subsidies, low-interest or zero-interest rate loans for projects
which contribute to the enhancement of water quality and the preservation of the
environment.
It has been admitted that the Parliamentary control over the Agencies’ taxes
was insufficient with regards article 4 of the Constitution, as these taxes represent
in fact “general taxes”. Therefore the legislative supervision over the definition
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Table 1: Tax revenues by Water Agency and multiyear intervention program (in
million e)
Multi-year Program
5 (1987-91) 6 (1992-96) 7 (1997-02) 8 (2003-06) 9 (2007-)
Adour-Garonne
- 517.83 800.28 595.40 308.90
% agriculture - 1.66 2.32 2.47 7.65
% industry - 26.96 20.37 15.21 9.81
Artois-Picardie
- 421.01 658.76 466.86 109.38
% agriculture - 0.11 0.34 0.54 0.62
% industry - 22.85 15.40 14.49 7.58
Loire-Bretagne
306.88 739.02 1362.76 949.03 243.48
% agriculture 1.62 1.98 1.93 3.39 4.13
% industry 21.94 20.44 16.07 16.05 14.39
Rhin-Meuse
207.60 508.04 791.88 598.15 150.37
% agriculture 0 0 0.33 0.52 0.19
% industry 44.33 28.53 20.17 17.59 20.52
Rhoˆne-Me´diterrane´e-Corse
465.95 1245.99 1660.10 1454.33 368.42
% agriculture 2.39 1.11 0.66 0.79 0.67
% industry 27.00 17.76 11.53 9.75 9.70
Seine-Normandie
- 2142.72 3758.32 2466.85 1378.83
% agriculture - 0.41 0.82 0.78 0.37
% industry - 13.37 9.88 9.14 6.03
Notes. For the 9th multiyear programme, data are available for the year 2007 for
all Water Agencies, except for Seine-Normandie, for which data are available for
2007 and 2008.
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Table 2: Subsidies by Water Agency and multiyear intervention program (in
million e)
Multi-year Program
5 (1987-91) 6 (1992-96) 7 (1997-02) 8 (2003-06) 9 (2007-)
Adour-Garonne
185.57 461.61 605.44 507.97 963.40
% agriculture 2.87 0.84 7.73 5.19 6.46
% industry 24.50 28.92 5.87 17.38 17.15
Artois-Picardie
- 340.49 400.48 263.19 490.80
% agriculture - 1.65 11.15 8.49 8.42
% industry - 36.43 4.64 6.46 14.32
Loire-Bretagne
- 229.76 1017.97 999.98 1342.50
% agriculture - 17.07 18.47 17.61 9.24
% industry - 3.63 10.78 5.85 8.40
Rhin-Meuse
176.15 494.08 633.32 439.57 780.24
% agriculture 0 2.35 8.94 6.82 5.61
% industry 42.40 28.15 33.59 20.41 21.10
Rhoˆne-Me´diterrane´e-Corse
- 699.90 1836.48 1194.51 2237.20
% agriculture - 0.69 3.84 2.15 3.04
% industry - 20.31 23.67 10.99 27.18
Seine-Normandie
816.33 1951.77 2976.63 1723.91 2878.20
% agriculture 0.13 0.83 2.95 3.66 5.27
% industry 14.45 8.62 6.34 3.38 6.14
Notes. For the 9th multiyear programme, data are available for the year 2007 for
all Water Agencies, except for Seine-Normandie, for which data are available for
2007 and 2008.
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of tax bases and unit tax rates was considered insufficient and a reform had to
take place. Moreover, the Parliament did not intervene in the supervision of
the multiyear intervention programs of the Water Agencies, although the total
Agencies’ budget was around 1 percent of all civil expenditures of the State.
The reform of 2006 was devoted to making the system compliant with the
Constitution, by reinforcing the role of the Parliament. To compensate for such
a “nationalisation” process, the role of Basin Committees is reinforced, while
maintaining the control from the State. The goal of the reform was also to
optimise operational efficiency and provide enough flexibility in the determination
of taxes.
In compliance with article 34 of the Constitution, the law now sets the rules
on tax bases and ceilings for the unit tax rates. The law also provides the main
orientations for the multiyear intervention programs, sets the expected level of
agencies’ budget and leaves to the government the task of supervising the objec-
tives in terms of expenses by major domain of intervention.
2.2 The River Basin Committees and the Executive Boards
of the Water Agencies
The Water Act of December 16, 1964 has decided the creation of six river basins,
with a RBC and a WA in each. Concertation and user participation are the rule
since this date, as users and local elected persons are represented and have a
majority in both the Committee and the Executive Board of the WA. The RBC
has three colleges: local elected persons, users and representatives of the State
(administration). Each college elects among its members the administrators of
the Water Agency.
The Water Act of January 2, 1992 instituted the principle and the tools of
integrated water management by river basin. This law also translates European
directives into French national law. These new tools are the SDAGE (Sche´mas
Directeurs d’Ame´nagement et de Gestion des Eaux) and the SAGE (Sche´mas
d’Ame´nagement et de Gestion des Eaux). The SDAGE are designed by the RBCs,
while the SAGE are designed at the sub-river basin level, in the framework of the
Local Water Commission, which includes 50 percent elected persons, 25 percent
users and 25 percent representatives of the State.
RBCs are the expression of the decentralised management of the resource by
river basin. Consisting of elected members of local and parliamentary chambers,
of representatives of users and of the public administration, these Committees
are in charge of elaborating the environmental objectives of the river basin within
the framework of the SDAGE. The Executive Board of the Agency is a subset of
the Basin Committee, with the exception of its president, who is nominated by
a governmental decree (and a representative of the Agency staff).
River Basin Committees are often considered the parliament of the river basin,
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with the Water Agency being the executive body in charge of implementing the
policy.
The government determines the number of Basin Committee members, includ-
ing the representation of each category of users (agriculture, tourism, industry,
etc.) For example in 1999, members of River Basin Committees and Executive
Boards of all Agencies have been renewed with a better representation of com-
munities (urban and rural), consumer associations, environmental associations,
agriculture and a new representative for small and medium industries. There are
now about 40 percent of members for local communities (elected persons), 40
percent for user representatives, and 20 percent for representatives of the State.
Often presented as “Water Parliaments”, River Basin Committees participate
in the design and adoption of the multiyear intervention programs, they deter-
mine the major priorities of the intervention policy of the Agencies, they vote on
the tax basis and emission tax rates. In practice, they discuss on the proposal by
the Executive Board on use and emission tax rates, and on tax bases. They also
discuss on the allocation of the budget to the funding of local projects regarding
water resources, through subsidies. The important aspect is that the Executive
Board presents a proposal which has to be agreed upon, and verified that it is con-
sistent with the maximum budget allowed by the Parliament (because expenses
must be fully covered by tax receipts).
The composition of River Basin Committees depends on the geographical
range of the basin (between 70 and 120 members). Representatives of the State
have the minority while the number of local elected persons is greater than 1/3
on average, and representatives of users and socio-professional groups have the
majority.
The distribution of industry representatives by sector is decided by govern-
mental decree, and is expected to be representative of existing economic interests.
The Executive Board of the Water Agency has the same number of members
for all Agencies. Initially of 16 in 1966, it is now 25 (plus the President) since
the 15 September 1986 decree. It now gives the same representation to the local
communities and users as the State. Administrators of the Agency are elected
by the members of the River Basin Committee (except the representatives of the
State), within each college (see above).
Table 3 presents for example the distribution of representatives in WAs, dur-
ing the 8th action programme (2003-2006). It can be seen that the proportion
of representatives for local communities, regions and districts is significant, com-
pared to the representatives of water users (agriculture, industry, residential water
users). Representatives of the State are also included, from various Ministries as
well as from State prefectures. Representatives from the agricultural sector are
typically more numerous in River Basin Committees characterized by a higher
agricultural activity, as Adour-Garonne and Loire-Bretagne.
Commissions within the RBC are delegated by the Executive Board to work
on important projects. It is important to note also a Subsidy Commission and
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Table 3: Distribution of representatives in River Basin Committees, 8th Action
Programme (2003-2006)
Agency
AG AP LB RM RMC SN
Region 6 3 8 3 5 7
District 18 17 28 15 26 25
Inter-district 3 1 2 4 1 4
Rural communities 1 1 1 1 1 4
Urban communities 2 2 4 3 4 12
Coastal communities 0 0 0 0 0 2
Other communities 8 5 7 3 11 21
Agriculture 7 4 7 2 6 7
Fishery & fish industry 4 3 6 2 6 8
Tourism 2 1 3 1 3 3
Industry 11 12 17 11 17 25
Energy 2 0 1 1 2 2
Water supply industry 2 1 1 1 3 3
Residential water users 4 2 4 2 4 6
Ecologists 4 3 5 3 5 9
Professional bodies 8 5 12 5 8 11
Ministry of Environment 1 1 1 1 1 7
Ministry of land devt. & rural affairs 1 1 1 1 1 1
Ministry of health 1 1 1 1 1 2
Ministry of the Interior 1 1 1 1 1 2
Ministry of Industry 1 1 1 1 1 2
Ministry of Agriculture 1 1 1 1 1 2
Other ministries 3 7 5 4 6 15
State prefectures 6 2 9 3 7 8
Total 97 75 126 71 121 187
Notes. AG: Adour-Garonne, AP: Artois-Picardie, LB: Loire-Bretagne, RM: Rhin-
Meuse, RMC: Rhoˆne-Me´diterrane´e-Corse, SN: Seine-Normandie.
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a Program Commission. The Subsidy Commission makes recommendations on
major subsidies to be granted to water-related projects. The Executive Board of
the Water Agency deliberates on the multiyear intervention programs (Program
Commission), use and emission tax rates and tax basis, deliberates on the general
conditions for attribution of subsidies, and on the actual granting of subsidies
(Subsidy Commission). A proposal is constructed by the Executive Board and
submitted for approval to the River Basin Committee. If it is not accepted by the
latter, a new proposal is constructed by taking (some of) the recommendations
of the River Basin Committee. If not accepted, the previous plan on taxes is
maintained, until an agreement is reached.
3 The Sequential Model of Bargaining
In this paper, we will ignore the tax dimension of the problem and assume that the
total amount of tax collected and its distribution among the different categories
of users is exogenous. We will focus exclusively on the distribution of the budget
(resulting from the taxes) among the different users in terms of projects financing.
We proceed as if the unique task of the water agency committee was to decide
how to allocate a given budget, denoted by B, among a number of possible
alternative recipients/uses. If the number of users is k, then an outcome of the
decision process is a vector with k nonnegative coordinates summing to B. We
should note that the social situation considered here is zero-sum and conflictual,
leaving no room for efficiency considerations: every vector is a Pareto optimum as
the groups are in competition to obtain the financing of their demands/projects.
The game we consider is a bargaining game where each player can in a way or
another influence at some stage the outcome of the process.
Precisely, we will assume that the game is sequential with two stages. In
the fist stage, the players will interact to decide which fraction of the budget
is distributed proportionally to the taxes paid by the different groups. If this
fraction is say 20%, it means that 20% of the budget is allocated on the base
of taxes. Denoting by B′ = B
5
this budget, then, if the tax contribution of the
residential users is, say, 35%, this means that the projects emanating from that
group will receive a support corresponding to 35% of B′. This way of proceeding
is the implementation of Margaret Thatcher’s device “We are simply asking to
have our own money back”.
In the second stage, the players will interact to decide how to allocate the
residual buget, say B′′ = 4B
5
among the recipients. In the second stage no con-
straints (besides feasibility) are imposed on the division of B′′. The game which
is described in the next section consists in each round of a sequence of proposal
and votes. We will calculate the sequential equilibrium of that game.
We will write down the equilibrium predictions for different specification of
the parameters on top of which the probabilities describing the chances to become
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a proposer. The main feature of the equilibrium solution will be described at well
as its comparative statics. Since it is possible in general to obtain a closed-form
solution of the equilibrium equations, we will use a numerical algorithm to solve
for optimal solutions (see Section 4).
3.1 Related Literature
Our model has its roots in the literature on bargaining. The closest theoretical
papers to our model are Baron and Ferejohn (1989) and Banks and Duggan (
2001) hereafter denoted as BF1 and BD. Like BF, we assume that the policy
consists in the distribution of a budget among a group of users. Their bargaining
game consists in a sequence (possibly infinite) of stages where at each stage a
proposer is selected to make a proposal which is submitted to a vote. If a win-
ning coalition of players vote in favor of the proposal, then the game ends and
the proposal is implemented. Unlike BF, we have a first stage with a sequence
(possibly infinite) of rounds: at each round a proposer is selected to make a pro-
posal (a proposal is a %) which is submitted to vote. If a winning coalition of
players vote in favor of the proposal then the game ends and the first stage is
completed. The difference with BF is that a proposal is here a scalar instead of
a vector. The relevant bargaining model is the general BD model which consid-
ers arbitrary unidimensional or multidimensional policy spaces. In our second
stage, we are back in the policy situation considered by BF but, for the sake of
tractability, instead of modelling the second stage as BF did, we model it as an
ultimatum game (one round instead of a sequence of rounds).
When we solve backward for the two-stage game, the reduced game that we
obtain is thus a BD game where the players have anticipated rationaly their
payoffs in the continuation game. More precisely, given the fraction proposed
in stage 1 and the residual budget which will be distributed in stage 2, they
can calculate their shares in stage 2. This amounts to calculating the chance of
being a proposer and the chance of being listed in a proposal initiated by another
proposer. By accepting to go for stage 2, players endorse a risk as the outcome
of stage 2 is not known with certainty. In stage 1, their attitude towards risk
combined with their characteristics as taxpayers determine their indirect utility
for rule versus discretion. We therefore obtain a one dimensional BD bargaining
problem, which has been investigated by many authors whose contributions are
discussed below.
1Eraslan (2002) extends the analysis of BF to set-ups with heterogeneous discounts and
recognition probabilities (or protocols), and consider the full range of super-majority rules.
She establishes the uniqueness of stationary subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs under linear
utilities, and shows that expected payoffs are egalitarian under a wide range of asymmetric
protocols. Her uniqueness result has been further generalized by Eraslan and Mc Lennan
(2006).
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The closest empirical paper to ours is Kauppi and Widgren (2004). Like us2,
they want to constrast two alternative explanations of the allocation of the Euro-
pean union (EU) budget. In their setting, the players are the countries which are
state members of the EU. One possible explanation called the “needs view” pos-
tulates that members allocations are determined by principles of solidarity which
can be evaluated in several ways. Given that the bulk of the budget spending
is devoted to agriculture and poor regions, Kauppi and Widgren measure the
needs of the EU countries by the extent of their agricultural production and their
relative income levels. A second explanation called the “power politics view”
considers the problem, as we do, as a divide-the-dollar bargaining game where
the power of of the player is exclusively described by his voting weight. Power is
evaluated through power indices with a special attention to the Shapley-Shubik
index. Kauppi and Widgren conduct an empirical analysis based on 1976-2001
data on the patterns of the EU budget shares and on measures of each member
state’s needs and political power. Their results indicate that at least 60% of the
budget expenditures can be attributed to selfish power politics and the remaining
40% to the declared benevolent budget policies. Hower, when they apply specific
voting power measures that allow for correlated preferences and cooperative vot-
ing patterns between the member states, their estimates indicate that the power
politics view explains as much as 90% of the budget shares.
Kauppi and Widgren’s bargaining solution is borrowed from cooperative game
theory, in contrast to ours which is based on a non-cooperative bargaining game.
Kauppi and Widgren’s measure of power is entirely based upon the voting weight,
while ours also depends of the proposal power. Several empirical analysis and test-
ing of the Baron-Ferejohn’s predictions have been conducted. Knight3 (2005) has
estimated the value of power proposal on the basis of the decisions of the US House
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure. Each transportation project is
matched with a congressional district (city or county name). Summary statistics
show that almost all committee members received at least some project spend-
ing, 72% of non-committee members in 1991 were excluded from the coalition.
Committee members averaged $55 million and non-committee members only $ 6
million in 19914. Knight runs simple a regression with the project spending as
the dependent variable, and representation in the commitee as explanatory vari-
ables, and tests for the theoretical prediction both in quantitative and qualitative
terms. He concludes that the evidence supports the key qualitative predictions
of the BF bargaining model.
Empirical models of bargaining in the BF vein has also been considered in
2We contrast the ”rule view” with the ”power view” or ”discretion view”.
3See also Knight (2004).
4For more anecdoctical or statistical evidence of positive correlation between federal spend-
ing in jurisdictions and representation by politically powerful congressional delegations (rep-
resentatives in relevant committees especially those with tenure or in the majority party), see
Ferejohn (1974) and Levitt and Poterba (1999).
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corporate finance (Eraslan, 2002) and in the analysis of the formation of coalition
governments in Europe (Diermeier and Merlo, 2004).
3.2 The Basic Setting
The policy space is the simplex X ≡
{
x ∈ Rk+ :
∑k
i=1 xi = 1
}
where k denotes
the number of different categories of users. Without loss of generality, we assume
that the total budget to be distributed is equal to 1. The decision making process
whose ultimate objective is to implement a policy x ∈ X is described as a game
whose players are the members of the RBC. In our setting, the budget is defined
as the total amount of taxes which are collected by the WA. We denote by γi the
fraction of aggregate taxes paid by the ith category of users, i.e.,
γi =
ti
k∑
j=1
tj
.
where ti is the amount of taxes paid by the i
th group of users. The vector γ =
(γ1, γ2, ..., γk)) will play an important role in our model. Hereafter , we assume,
without loss of generality, that the coordinates of the vector γ are increasing i.e.
γi ≤ γi+1 for all i = 1, ..., k − 1.
Let n denote the total number of players (committee members). Some of these
members are representatives of the different categories of users while others are
representatives of central administrations or of local governments. We sassume
that each of these groups has at least one direct representative in the committee.
This implies that n ≥ k. The representatives of water users in the committee are
assumed to be selfish i.e. driven exclusively by their own shares in the proposal. In
contrast, the preferences of the other committee members can possibly aggregate
the welfare of the k categories of users. We index them by j = k + 1, . . . , n. We
assume that each member j = k + 1, . . . , n assigns weight or relative importance
βji to any group i = 1...k. Then, given the vector of shares x = (x1, ..., xk) the
utility of any member j = k + 1, . . . , n is given as:
uj (x) =
k∑
i=1
βji ui(xi),
where ui : R+ → R+ is a twice continuously differentiable function such that
u′i > 0 and u
′′
i < 0 and for any j = k + 1, . . . , n and i = 1, . . . , k, the weights
βji ∈ [0, 1] and
∑k
i=1 β
j
i = 1. Note that we do not impose the weights to be
strictly exclusive. For instance, we could have a representative acting exclusively
as a representative of one category of users. In what follows, we refer to the
situation where all the vectors βj have all their coordinates equal to 0 except one
14
as the corner regime. It corresponds to the situation where each representative
j = k + 1, . . . , n acts on behalf of a single group of users.
Players will act as voters and as proposers. The voting side will be described
by a weighted majority game. We denote by qi the voting weight (number of
representives) of sector i for all i = 1, ..., k. We assume that all other vot-
ers have a weight equal to 1. The quota Q of the game could be in principle
any number between
⌊
(
∑k
i=1 qi)+(n−k)
2
⌋
5 and
(∑k
i=1 qi
)
+ (n − k). Therefore, in
principle, our framework allows for a wide range of voting mechanisms. When
Q =
⌊
(
∑k
i=1 qi)+(n−k)
2
⌋
, to be passed, a proposal needs the approval of a majority
of members while when Q =
(∑k
i=1 qi
)
+ (n− k), unanimity is required. Unless
otherwise specified, we will assume hereafter that Q is the majority quota. The
set of (minimal) winning coalitions is denoted by (Wm) W .
The distribution of proposal powers is described by a vector p = (p1, p2, ..., pn)
such that pi ≥ 0 for all i = 1, ..., n, and ∑ni=1 pi = 1. Here, pi denotes the prob-
ability that member i is recognized to be in charge of making a proposal. As
demonstrated by Kalandrakis (2006) in the case of the Baron and Ferejohn ’s
bargaining game, the vector p has a strong impact on the equilibrium outcome.
More precisely, under some minimal qualifications, any policy in X can be ob-
tained as an equilibrium outcome for an appropriate choice of p. While playing
an important role in our framework too, it will not have such a strong impact.
The game form we consider works as follows. We model the process as a
decision which is decomposed into two steps. One the one hand, players may
decide that a fraction α of the total budget is allocated according to the vector
γ: for this part of the budget, each group of users receives a share corresponding
to its tax contribution. On the other, the residual part of the budget, 1 − α, is
not subject to any constraint.
Formally, the game has two stages. The first stage is a bargaining game a la
Banks and Duggan on the one-dimensional variable α. The game is a sequential
game with a possibly (infinite) number of rounds. At each round t, a proposer
is i(t) is selected. He makes a proposal α(i, , t). Each member of the committee
approves (a) or rejects (r) the proposal. If the subset of members who approve
the proposal is a winning coalition, then the proposal is adopted. Otherwise, we
move to round t+ 1 and the procedure is repeated. If the procedure never ends,
the vector γ is adopted.
The second stage (if any, as if α = 1 there is no budget left for stage 2) is
an ultimatum game. A proposer i is selected, and makes a proposal x(i) ∈ X.
Each member of the committee approves (a) or rejects (r) the proposal x(i). If
the subset of members who approve the proposal is a winning coalition, then the
proposal is adopted. Otherwise, the vector γ is adopted for the residual budget.
5For any real number x, bxc denotes the smallest integer greater than x.
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The payoffs of the members j = 1, ..., n are described by their utility functions
uj and their discount factor δj ∈ [0, 1].6
3.3 The Second Stage (Continuation Game)
We describe in this subsection the ultimatum game. The final outcome of this
subgame is the allocation of (1− α) among the groups of users. Nature draws
proposer j with probability pj ≥ 0. Of course, ∑kj=1 pj = 1. Proposer j selects
a vector xj ∈ Rk+ such that
∑k
i=1 x
j
i = (1− α). We denote by Sα such simplex.
If a majority of voters vote in favor of the proposal, the proposal is adopted.
Otherwise, the proposal is defeated and the default option γ is used to allocate the
residual fraction of the budget. The voting response is quite easy to characterize.
Voter l will vote for the proposal xj if
vl
(
xj
) ≡ ul (αγ + xj) ≥ ul (γ) = vl (γ) .
We assume here that ties are broken in favor of the proposer. If the proposer
(who acts here as a principal) wants the proposal to be passed, he will consider
the cost of buying a minimal winning coalition. Let S be any such coalition. In
such case the constraints are
ul
(
αγ + xj
) ≥ ul (γ) for all l ∈ S,
and the problem of the principal (proposer j) reads:
Max
xj∈Sα
uj
(
αγ + xj
)
,
subject to the constraints
ul
(
αγ + xj
) ≥ ul (γ) for all l ∈ S\ {j} .
Let us denote by C(α, S, j) the value of this problem and by C(α, j) the value
Max
S∈Wm
C(α, S, j). We also denote by xj∗ (α) the optimal solution of this problem.
For the time being, we proceed as if this solution was unique.
Let us look at the solution for the corner regime under complete information.7
In such case, each player j = k + 1, ..., n acts on behalf of one of the single
group. Let us denote by Mi (mi) the group(number) of representatives in the set
{k + 1, ..., n} acting for user i. We have obviously
k∑
i=1
mi = n− k.
6In the remaining of the paper, we takeδj = 1,∀j = 1, . . . , n. The general case is discussed
in Section 5.
7See Appendices 1 and 2 for a discussion on the difficulties associated with interior regimes
and incomplete information.
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In such case, the group of voters voting on behalf of the interest of the group
i has a weight equal to
wi = qi +mi.
Further, the group of supporters of group i will vote in favor of the proposal
if and only if
xi ≥ γi (1− α) .
In such case, things are as if proposer j representing group i(j) makes a
proposal to win the votes of a winning coalition in a weighted majority game
with {1, 2, ..., k} as the set of players and wi being the weight of player i. The
probability of player i to be selected as a proposer is now equal to p̂i = pi +∑
j∈Mi p
j. The set of (minimal) winning coalitions of this simple game is denoted
by (Ŵm) Ŵ . It is straightforward to see that in such a case,
C(α, S, j) = (1− α)−
∑
i∈S\{j}
γi (1− α) = (1− α)
1− ∑
i∈S\{j}
γi
 ,
and therefore
C(α, j) = (1− α) (1− Min
S∪{j}∈Ŵm
∑
i∈S\{j}
γi).
As we can see , the problem in such a case amounts to calculating Min
S∪{j}∈Ŵm
∑
i∈S\{j}
γi.
This problem can be formulated as a combinatorial optimization problem as fol-
lows:
Min
xj∈Rk−1+
k∑
i=1,i 6=j
γizi,
subject to the constraints
k∑
i=1,i 6=j
wizi ≥

k∑
i=1
wi
2
− wj
and zi ∈ {0, 1} for all i = 1, ..., k.
The integer constraints transform this rather simple linear problem into a
difficult problem identified in the operations research literature as the Knapsack
Problem ( Kellerer, Pferschy and Pisinger (2004), Martello and Toth (1990)8).
8See also Chakravarty, Goel and Sastry (2000) and Prasad and Kelly (1990).
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No simple algorithm exists to find the solution (and the value) in polynomial
time. If we consider the linear relaxation
zi ∈ [0, 1] for all i = 1, ..., k,
things become very simple. Indeed, let us consider the impact of a small change
(dzi, dzl) leaving the constraint unchanged i.e; such that widzi + wldzl = 0. The
change in the objective is equal to γidzi + γldzl = dzi(γi − γl wiwl ). Therefore,
if γi
wi
> γi
wl
then the change is positive if dzi is positive and negative otherwise.
This suggests the following optimal solution. Order the numbers
(
γi
wi
)
1≤i≤k
in
increasing order. Let σ be that order. Then, define
zσ(i) = 1 for all i = 1, .., i
∗ − 1
and
zσ(i∗) =

k∑
i=1
wi
2
− wj −
i∗−1∑
i=1
wσ(i)zσ(i),
where
i∗ = Inf
1≤i≤n
i :
i∗−1∑
i=1
wσ(i)zσ(i) ≥

k∑
i=1
wi
2
− wj
 .
This algorithm is simple but its performance under the integer constraints is
not clear. Of course, for a small value of k , in particular k = 3, we can find
the solution by elementary checking. Let k = 3 and let us assume that the three
coalitions {1, 2} , {1, 3} and {2, 3} are minimal winning coalitions. In such a case,
Min
S∪{j}∈Ŵm
∑
i∈S\{j}
γi = Min
l∈{1,2,3}\{j}
γl. This means that
If j = 1, then x1∗(α) = (1− α)) (1− γ2, γ2, 0) .
If j = 2, then x2∗(α) = (1− α)) (γ1, 1− γ1, 0) .
If j = 3, then x3∗(α) = (1− α)) (γ1, 0, 1− γ1) .
Note also that the problem has a straightforward solution in the symmetric
case, i.e., when wi = 1 for all i = 1, ..., k. In such case, if j /∈
{
1, 2, ..., k−1
2
}
:
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zi =
(
1 if i = 1, 2, ..., k−1
2
,
0 otherwise,
and if j ∈ {1, 2, ..., k−1
2
}
:
zi = zi =
(
1 if i = 1, 2, ..., k+1
2
and i 6= j,
0 otherwise.
As we have seen, the closed-form determination of xji∗ may be rather difficult
in the general case (even under our assumption of corner regime) as there exists
a trade-off between the voting weight wi of a player and its cost as reflected by
his reservation value γi.
3.4 The First Stage
The first stage is a one-dimensional bargaining game a la Banks and Duggan
once we account for the backward solution of the continuation game. When the
continuation game has been solved, we have the optimal solution xj∗ (α) for all
j = 1, ..., k. We ignore for the moment the issue of multiplicity and the attached
issue of randomization. Therefore, in the first stage of the game, each player i
looks at the choice of α as truly the choice of a lotery where he receives a prize
equals to xji∗ (α) with probability p
j. The (instantaneous) expected utility Vi (α)
of player i is equal to
k∑
j=1
pjui
(
αγi + x
j
i∗ (α)
)
.
Here, when j 6= i, xji∗ is either equal to 0 or to (1− α) γi. The true determinant
of his expected utility consist therefore of two numbers: the probability denoted
P i that i is considered in the continuation game when i is not the proposer himself,
and the coalition Si of groups who receive a positive share in his proposal. The
total share xi of player i is equal to
αγi + (1− α)
(
1−∑j∈Si γj) = γi + (1− α)∑j∈N\Si∪{i} γj with probability p̂i,
γi with probability P̂
i,
αγi with probability 1− p̂i − P i.
We deduce that
Vi (α) = p̂
iui
γi + (1− α) ∑
j∈N\Si∪{i}
γj
+ P̂ iui (γi)
+(1− p̂i − P̂ i)ui (αγi) .
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Straightforward calculations lead to
V ′i (α) = −p̂i
 ∑
j∈N\Si∪{i}
γj
u′i
γi + (1− α) ∑
j∈N\Si∪{i}
γj
+γi(1−p̂i−P̂ i)u′i (αγi) ,
and
V ′′i (α) = p̂
i
 ∑
j∈N\Si∪{i}
γj
2 u′′i
γi + (1− α) ∑
j∈N\Si∪{i}
γj
+(γi)2 (1−p̂i−P̂ i)u′′i (αγi) .
We deduce from our assumption on ui that V
′′
i (α) < 0 for all α ∈ [0, 1], i.e.,
the function is strictly concave on the unit interval. We will denote by α∗i the
(unique) peak of player i. Since all the assumptions of Banks and Duggan are
met, we deduce from their results that if all the players are perfectly patient,
then the equilibrium outcomes of the game coincide with the core. This implies
that if k is odd, then the equilibrium is unique and equal to the median value α∗
of the vector (α∗1, ..., α
∗
k). We will discuss below what happens when the players
are not perfectly patient or when the voting game is not the majority game. Let
si ≡
∑
j∈Si γj. The following proposition summarizes the information that we
have.
Proposition
Assume that the utility function ui (xi) is such that ui (0) = 0, u
′
i > 0, u
′′
i ≤ 0,
then V ′′i (α) ≤ 0 on [0, 1] for any i = 1, ..., k. Moreover, there exist threshold
values γ
i
and γi such that 0 ≤ γ
i
< γi ≤ 1 and:
(i) if 0 ≤ γi ≤ γi function Vi (α) is decreasing on the whole interval [0, 1];
(ii) if γ
i
< γi < γi function Vi (α) has a unique maximum on the interval
(0, 1);
(iii) if γi > γi function Vi (α) is increasing on the whole interval [0, 1].
The thresholds γi and γi are calculated as:
γi =
p̂i(1− si)
1− P̂i
(1)
and
γ
i
=
p̂i(1− si)u′i(1− si)
p̂iu′i(1− si) +
(
1− p̂i − P̂i
)
u′i(0)
. (2)
20
Proof.
The first derivative of the expected utility is:
V ′i (α) = p̂iu
′
i(αγi + (1− α)(1− si))(γi + si − 1) + (3)
+(1− p̂i − P̂i)u′i(αγi)γi.
The second derivative is
V ′′i (α) = p̂iu
′′
i (αγi + (1− α)(1− si))(γi + si − 1)2 + (4)
+(1− p̂i − P̂i)u′′i (αγi) (γi)2 .
Since u′′i (·) < 0 it follows from (4) that V ′′i (α) ≤ 0.
It is easy to see that
V ′i (1) = u
′
i(γi)
[
(1− P̂i)γi − p̂i(1− si)
]
,
therefore for γi ≥ γi = p̂i(1−si)1−P̂i the function V
′
i (1) ≥ 0 and for γi ≤ γi the opposite
inequality holds true.
The derivative at α = 0 is:
V ′i (0) = p̂iu
′
i(1− si)(γi + si − 1) + (1− p̂i − P̂i)u′i(0)γi.
One can check that: V ′i (0) ≤ 0 if and only if γi ≤ γi, where γi satisfies (2).
Since u′′i ≤ 0 we can deduce that u′i(0) ≥ u′i(1− si). Substituting this into (2)
we prove that γ
i
≤ γi.
Since P̂i ≤ 1− p̂i from (1) we deduce that γi ≤ 1.
Summing up, for 0 ≤ γi < γi the function Vi (α) is decreasing on the whole
interval [0, 1], for γi > γi it is increasing on the whole interval, and for γ ≤ γi ≤ γi
it has unique maximum on the interval [0, 1].
3.5 Examples
From the above arguments, it is clear that any more accurate description of the
peaks α∗i and the median α
∗ will rely on more detailed information on the pa-
rameters of the game. We illustrate the proposition through a series of examples.
Example 1 Suppose the players have the same weights and the same probabilities
of being chosen as the proposer, i.e., ωi = 1 and p̂i = 1/k for each i = 1, . . . , k
Then:
V1 (α) =
1
k
u1(αγ1 + (1− α)(1− s1)) + (1− 1
k
)u1(γ1),
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where s1is defined in a similar way as before. Then:
V ′1 (α) =
1
n
u′1(αγ1 + (1− α)(1− s1))[γ1 − 1 + s1].
The term in the square brackets is non-positive, therefore α∗i = 0, i.e., he
prefers pure bargaining outcome. The reason is that everybody chooses him as a
coalitional partner.
On the contrary, nobody would choose player k as a coalitional partner. One
can check that in this case:
Vn (α) =
1
k
un(αγn + (1− α)(1− sn)) +
(
1− 1
k
)
un(αγn)
and
V ′n (1) =
1
k
u′n(γn)(1− sn))[nγn − 1 + sn].
The term in the square brackets is positive since nγn >
k∑
j=1
γj = 1. Therefore,
player k never prefers pure bargaining outcome, i.e. α∗k ∈ (0, 1] .
The second example calls our example on the role of the risk aversion param-
eters.
Example 2 Suppose that ωi = 1 and γi = p̂i = 1/k for each i = 1, . . . , k.
The players differ only in risk aversion, and for simplicity we consider CARA
(Constant Absolute Risk Aversion) utility functions ui(x) = 1 − e−ρix, where
ρi > 0. We also consider an arbitrary quota Q.
One may check that si =
Q−1
k
and P̂i = (1− 1k )Qk . Then:
γi =
k + 1−Q
k(k −Q) +Q >
1
k
.
Therefore, in this case nobody would choose α = 1.
It is easy to check that:
γ
i
=
k + 1−Q
k + (k − 1)(k −Q)eρi k+1−Qk
.
It implies that for ρi ≤ kk+1−Q ln kk−1 ≡ ρ the lower bound γi is larger thanor equal
to 1
k
. Thus, if the coefficient ρi ≤ ρ then α∗i = 0. On the other hand, for ρi > ρi,
γ
i
< 1
n
, and α∗i ∈ (0, 1) that is calculated as α∗i = 1 − ρρi . Summing up, for this
particular case:
α∗i =
{
0, if ρi ≤ ρ,
1− ρ
ρi
, if ρi > ρ
.
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In the case where k is odd and Q = k+1
2
, we obtain:
α∗i =
{
0, if ρi ≤ 2kk+1 ln kk−1
1−
2k
k+1
ln k
k−1
ρi
, if ρi >
2k
k+1
ln k
k−1
In such case, if ρi ≤ ρ for at least Q players then the median voter’s ideal point
α∗ = 0 , and then the whole budget will be allocated according to the bargaining
procedure. On the contrary, if there are at least Q players for whom ρi > ρ then
for these players α∗i ∈ (0, 1) and α∗ ∈ (0, 1). One may check that for k = 3 and
Q = 2, ρ ≈ 0.6. Let’s take for simplicity ρ1 ≤ ρ and ρ < ρ2 < ρ3. Then, α∗1 = 0
and α∗3 > α
∗
2 > 0, and α
∗ = α∗3 ∈ (0, 1)
In the last example, we considered the case where the probability of being a
proposer is equal to the (relative) tax contribution: the more you pay, the more
likely your are going leading the bargaining at the distributive stage. This is
similar to the situation considered by Peleg (1992)9 under the heading “Voting
by Count and Account”, where the political power of a player depends upon his
tax bill. In such case, it is easy to establish that all the budget is allocated in
the first stage ,i.e., rules dominates discretion.
Example 3 Suppose that ωi = 1 and γi = p̂i = γi for each i = 1, . . . , k.
First, let us consider the behavior of players i = 1; . . . , Q−1. They are always
included in a winning coalition because they are the “cheapest”. Therefore, their
expected utilities can be expressed as
Vi (α) = p̂iui
αγi + (1− α)
1− Q∑
j=1
j 6=i
γj

+ (1− p̂i)ui(γi).
It is easy to see that the derivative of Vi (α) is:
V ′i (α) = −p̂iu′i
αγi + (1− α)
1− Q∑
j=1
j 6=i
γj

 k∑
j=Q+1
γj.
Since u′i > 0 then V
′
i (α) < 0 for all i = 1, . . . , Q − 1. It means that each
i = 1, . . . , Q−1, α∗i = 0 at the first stage of the game. Note that this results holds
for any p̂i.
Player i = Q is included in a winning coalition when a proposer is any of
j = 1, . . . , Q− 1. Therefore, the expected utility for this player is
9See also O’Neill and Peleg (2000). It also appears in the case in the German pollution
management (The Genossenschaften) as studied by Klevorick and Kramer (1973).
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VQ (α) = p̂QuQ
(
αγQ + (1− α)
(
1−
Q−1∑
j=1
γj
))
+
Q−1∑
j=1
p̂iuQ (γQ)+
(
1−
Q∑
j=1
p̂j
)
uQ (αγQ) ,
and therefore:
V ′Q (α) = −p̂Qu′Q
(
αγQ + (1− α)
k∑
j=Q
γj
)
k∑
j=Q+1
γj +
k∑
j=Q+1
p̂ju′Q (αγQ) γQ.
Substituting for p̂i = γi for all i = 1...k we get
V ′Q (α) = γQ
k∑
j=Q+1
γj
[
u′Q (αγQ)− u′Q
(
αγQ + (1− α)
k∑
j=Q
γj
)]
and since u′i is decreasing then V
′
q (α) > 0. Therefore, α
∗
q = 1.
Now we turn to the behavior of the players i = Q + 1, ..., k. Any such player
i is never included to a winning coalition except the case when i himself is a
proposer. Therefore,
Vi (α) = p̂iui
(
αγi + (1− α)
(
1−
Q−1∑
j=1
γj
))
+ (1− p̂i)ui(αγi).
The derivative in this case is:
V ′i (α) = −p̂iu′i
(
αγi + (1− α)
k∑
j=Q
γj
)(
1− γi −
Q−1∑
j=1
γj
)
+
+(1− p̂i)u′i(αγi)γi.
Substituting for p̂i = γi for all i = 1, ..., k we get
V ′i (α) = γi(1− γi)
[
u′i(αγi)− u′i
(
αγi + (1− α)
k∑
j=Q
γj
)]
+
+γi
q−1∑
j=1
γju
′
i
(
αγi + (1− α)
k∑
j=Q
γj
)
. (5)
The first term is positive since u′i is decreasing and the second one is positive
since u′i > 0 for all i = 1, ..., k. Thus, V
′
i (α) > 0 for i = Q + 1, ..., k, and then
α∗i = 1 for i = Q+ 1, ..., k.
Summing up, we obtain that for q players i = q, ..., k the preferred α∗i = 1 and
therefore α∗ = 1 is chosen. It means that in this specific case there will be no
bargaining stage, the whole budget will be distributed according to the criterion.
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In all these examples, we have assumed that the weights are all equal. This is
a very peculiar assumption, as we have to remember that the game we consider
is a reduced game where in fact there are k players, as the n−k last players have
been asssumed to act as representatives of one on the k groups. So, even if the k
groups are equally represented, our assumption will be valid iff the n − k other
players distribute themselves equally among the k groups. It is not easy to derive
precise results in the general case, as the determination of the coalition Si for all
i is not straightforward.
4 Empirical Application
In this section, we present a statistical analysis of the WA policy instruments
in terms of tax and subsidy distribution across user categories. We also discuss
the composition of the River Basin Committees (relative number of representa-
tives) in more detail. Data collected on Water Agencies allow us to perform a
straightforward simulation experiment, to illustrate in particular the role of risk
aversion in the theoretical model presented above. We finally perform a reduced-
form econometric analysis of the relationship between the River Basin Committee
distribution and the tax or subsidy level.
4.1 Data
Data have been collected from the Water Agencies on two aspects:
- tax receipts and subsidies by category of user and year
- composition of River Basin Committees.
The period covers the years 1987-2007, although there are missing data for
some Agencies and years. Subsidies granted by Water Agencies are mostly de-
voted to infrastructure building and operating costs of abatement by private
agents or local communities. A number of subsidy programs are however devoted
by technical assistance and preliminary technical studies and reporting. Subsidies
include the following categories:
- Local communities, cities: municipal wastewater treatment plants, wastew-
ater networks, operational and technical assistance, refuse recycling;
- Industry: industrial pollution abatement plants, operational and tech-
nical assistance;
- Agriculture: point- and nonpoint-source pollution abatement;
- Environment: water resource management, restoration of aquatic areas,
restoration of drinking water sources.
Taxes include the following categories: urban and industrial wastewater ef-
fluent emissions, agricultural point source emissions (livestock), nonpoint source
emissions (pesticides, from 2006), residential and industrial water withdrawals
and net consumption, irrigation water withdrawals.
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Table 4: Average ratio of tax over subsidies for agriculture and industry, by Water
Agency and multiyear intervention program
Multi-year Program
6 (1992-96) 7 (1997-02) 8 (2003-06) 9 (2007-)
Adour-Garonne
% agriculture 2.5814 0.5334 1.3302 1.5200
% industry 1.111 4.8050 1.0411 0.7540
Artois-Picardie
% agriculture 0.1634 0.060 1.5206 0.0826
% industry 0.8433 5.7200 7.6250 0.6587
Loire-Bretagne
% agriculture 0.1806 0.2806 0.2229 0.2314
% industry 7.1860 2.1526 3.1320 1.6932
Rhin-Meuse
% agriculture 0.0000 0.0695 0.1189 0.0374
% industry 1.0462 0.8512 1.1843 2.3152
Rhoˆne-Me´diterrane´e-Corse
% agriculture 0.6601 0.2283 0.5158 0.1710
% industry 1.2963 0.5479 1.1144 1.0450
Seine-Normandie
% agriculture 0.8462 0.6280 0.4124 0.6484
% industry 1.4506 2.2652 3.9412 1.6721
Notes. % agriculture (resp. industry): ratio of tax over subsidies to agriculture
(resp. industry).
The proportion of subsidies received by each user category (agriculture, in-
dustry) is computed for each WA and each multiyear intervention programme.
To have an idea of the relative advantage associated with each user category,
we compute the ratio of tax over subsidies for agriculture and industry. Table
4 presents the average ratio, by Water Agency and multiyear intervention pro-
gramme. This ratio measures the “net contribution” of agriculture and industry,
a value of 1 indicating a neutral position regarding the Water Agency budget.
As can be seen from the table, almost all WAs grant more subsidies than they
collect taxes from agriculture, with the exception of Adour-Garonne. On the
other hand, industry is in a majority of cases contributing more in terms of tax
revenues. The ratio is highly heterogeneous across multiyear intervention pro-
grammes, reflecting the fact that changes in policy priorities have occured over
the period.
Regarding the River Basin Committees, the number of representatives is het-
erogeneous across river basins, and include water users, the administration and
economic sectors. We compute the proportion of each category of users (with a
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particular focus on agriculture and industry) with respect to the size of the entire
committee, and with respect to the number of user representatives (agriculture,
industry, tourism, fisheries, angling, energy producers, etc.) Table 5 presents the
distribution of Committee representatives for the three categories: agriculture,
industry, and environmental associations (ecologists). We distinguish in this ta-
ble between the proportion of representatives over the total number of committee
members, and the proportion over the total number of user representatives.
4.2 Simulation Experiment
The simulation experiment aims at exploring the optimal solutions provided by
the theoretical bargaining model, once model parameters have been calibrated
from the data. More precisely, we consider as a baseline the case of the Adour-
Garonne WA during the 8th Action Programme (2003-2006).
Nine categories of players are considered: 1 - Farmers ; 2 - Industry (incl.
energy) ; 3 - Urban communities ; 4 - Rural communities (incl. representatives of
the Ministries of Agriculture, Land Development and Rural Affairs ; 5 - Ministry
of Industry ; 6 - Environmental associations (incl. fishery, water suppliers, Min-
istries of Tourism, Health, Environment, the Interior, associations of residential
water users ; 7 - Other communities ; 8 - Districts and regions ; 9 - Professional
bodies. The first three categories correspond to water users (paying emission and
water use taxes, and receiving subsidies from the WA), while categories 4 to 6
are special-interest groups and Ministries. The last three categories, from 7 to 9,
consist of players having a less important role in RIver Basin Committees.
Based on the observed distribution of representatives in the Adour-Garonne
River Basin, we can compute the vector of weights (w) to be used in determining
winning coalitions. On the other hand, the vector of probabilities to be selected
as a proposer (p) is not observed; we therefore assume that pi = 2wi for i = 1, 2, 3,
pi = wi for i = 4, 5, 6, and pi = wi/2 for i = 7, 8, 9, and the probability vector is
normalized so that
∑n
i=1 pi = 1.
This provides us with the following vectors of weights and probabilities:
w = {0.0805, 0.1494, 0.0230, 0.0345, 0.0115, 0.2069, 0.0920, 0.3103, 0.0920}
p = {0.1600, 0.2971, 0.0457, 0.0343, 0.0114, 0.2057, 0.0457, 0.1543, 0.0457} .
The utility function of agents is not observed either. We assume a CRRA
(Constant Relative Risk Aversion) utility function of the form u(x) = x1−ρ/(1−
ρ), where ρ is the Arrow-Pratt risk aversion coefficient. The model solutions are
computed for various values of this coefficient: {0.05, 0.1, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75}, and we
assume for simplicity that all users have the same utility function.
The distribution of tax payments for user categories (γ) is computed from
the average multi-year budget over the entire action programme, and is equal
to γ = {0.0519, 0.1738, 0.7743}, corresponding to farmers, industries and local
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Table 5: Relative Composition of River Basin Committees (agriculture, industry,
ecologists)
Multi-year Program
5 (1987-91) 6 (1992-96) 7 (1997-02) 8 (2003-06) 9 (2007-)
Adour-Garonne
% agriculture 5.95 6.13 6.82 7.18 7.21
% agriculture / users 16.66 16.66 18.16 18.67 18.42
% industry 11.90 12.25 11.59 11.28 11.34
% industry / users 33.33 33.33 30.93 29.33 28.94
% ecologists 2.38 2.45 3.54 4.10 4.12
Artois-Picardie
% agriculture 4.41 4.51 5.16 5.40 5.33
% agriculture / users 11.53 11.19 13.22 14.28 14.28
% industry 16.17 16.56 16.51 16.22 16.00
% industry / users 42.30 41.05 42.15 42.85 42.85
% ecologists 2.94 3.01 3.75 4.05 4.00
Loire-Bretagne
% agriculture 6.14 6.31 6.25 5.87 5.55
% agriculture / users 16.66 17.00 16.57 15.61 14.89
% industry 14.03 14.44 13.63 13.33 13.49
% industry / users 38.09 38.83 36.13 35.43 36.17
% ecologists 2.63 2.70 3.49 3.92 3.96
Rhin-Meuse
% agriculture 1.64 1.70 2.50 2.85 2.81
% agriculture / users 4.54 4.54 6.64 7.69 7.69
% industry 16.39 17.07 16.37 15.71 15.49
% industry / users 45.45 45.45 43.35 42.30 42.30
% ecologists 3.27 3.41 4.04 4.28 4.22
Rhoˆne-Me´diterrane´e-Corse
% agriculture 4.80 4.80 4.82 4.89 4.95
% agriculture / users 13.15 12.63 12.50 12.37 12.24
% industry 15.38 15.38 14.26 13.88 14.05
% industry / users 42.10 40.42 36.94 35.05 34.69
% ecologists 2.88 2.88 3.65 4.08 4.13
Seine-Normandie
% agriculture 3.88 3.94 4.14 3.99 3.74
% agriculture / users 10.52 10.52 10.91 10.78 10.44
% industry 15.53 15.78 14.88 13.88 13.36
% industry / users 42.10 42.10 39.22 37.54 37.31
% ecologists 2.91 2.95 4.38 4.94 4.81
Notes. % agriculture (resp. industry) / users: proportion (in percent) of agricul-
tural (resp. industrial) representatives with respect to number of user represen-
tatives.
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communities in that order. Concerning the weights given to each user category
by the players, we consider first that users put a weight of 1 on their own category
and 0 on the k − 1 others. As for weights given by other players (i > 3), we
assume that the weights for categories 4 to 6 correspond to the ones for user
categories, given that the representatives therein have strong special interests
for farmers, industries and local communities respectively. For players 7 to 9,
we assume that other communities and professional bodies have more interest
in local communities as opposed to farmers and industries, while districts and
regions put equal weights on all users. The matrix of weights is the following
one, with categories in row and water users in column:
β =

1 0 0
0 1 0
0 0 1
1 0 0
0 1 0
0 0 1
0.3 0.2 0.5
1/3 1/3 1/3
0.2 0.3 0.5

.
The model is solved according to the following algorithm. First, we construct
the set of all possible coalitions (29) and retain the winning coalitions, with the
simple majority rule based on vector w. Second, we loop over a grid of values for
α ∈ [0, 1[ and for each α, we scan over all winning coalitions and consider each
player in turn in that coalition. For each, we find the optimal coalition when he is
a proposer, in terms of transfer minimization (when the proposer is a water user)
or of utility maximization otherwise. In the latter case, we solve numerically for
the optimal solution x∗ using a constrained non linear mathematical programming
algorithm. Third, we find for each player the set of optimal payments providing
the maximum expected utility, and we retain the corresponding α. Finally, we
find the first-stage solution for α by retaining the median value of the sorted
vector of αs over all players. This procedure is repeated for different values of
the risk aversion coefficient.
As an example, when the risk aversion parameter ρ = 0.5 and α = 0.15,
Table 6 reports the equilibrium shares from the second stage computed with our
procedure, for each player as a proposer in turn, as well as the corresponding
optimal winning coalition. It is interesting to see that, when water users are
proposers, the selected winning coalition always contains the set of all three
water users.
For the smallest value of the Arrow-Pratt coefficient (ρ = 0.05), the optimal
first-stage α is equal to 0.1, while for the other values of this parameter, the
optimal alpha is 0.15. This indicates that the solution is not very sensitive to
risk aversion, at least under the assumption that all agents have the same utility
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Table 6: Equilibrium budget shares form second stage and associated winning
coalitions , by proposer - α = 0.15, ρ = 0.5
Proposer p w Water users Players in coalition
player 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
1 0.1600 0.0805 0.7369 0.0483 0.2148 X X X X X X
2 0.2971 0.1494 0.0144 0.7707 0.2148 X X X X X X
3 0.0457 0.0230 0.0144 0.0483 0.9373 X X X X X X X
4 0.0345 0.0345 0.3118 0.2541 0.4341 X X X X X
5 0.0114 0.0114 0.2516 0.2757 0.4727 X X X X X X
6 0.2057 0.2057 0.2365 0.2854 0.4781 X X X X
7 0.1543 0.3103 0.2780 0.2907 0.4313 X X X X
8 0.1543 0.3103 0.2274 0.3443 0.4283 X X X X
9 0.0457 0.0920 0.8532 0.0261 0.1207 X X X X
function. 85 percent of the subsidy allocation is subject to bargaining, given the
weights associated to the players.
4.3 A Reduced-Form Econometric Analysis
The purpose of this subsection is to test for the assumption that the representa-
tion of the agricultural and industrial sectors in River Basin Committees has a
positive impact on subsidies received. Users are paying taxes according to their
contribution to water depletion and effluent emissions. Since the unit emission
tax rates are depending on a set of pollutants and that the various categories of
users have heterogeneous pollution patterns, the best way to represent the sector
contribution to Water Agency receipts is to consider the overall tax receipts by
category of tax (emissions or water use). In the following, we consider only the
agricultural and the industrial sectors as user groups, because the subsidy and
tax shares of the third group (the local communities) are directely obtained from
the complement to 1 of the sum for these sectors.
The system of equations is the following:
xijt = β0 + β1pijt + β2pikt + β3γijt + β4xikt + αi + εit, (6)
i = 1, 2, . . . , 6; t = 1, 2, . . . , T ; j, k = agriculture, industry,
where xijt is the share of total subsidies received by the user category j (agri-
culture, industry) by Water Agency i at time t, pijt and pikt are the proportions
of representatives in the River Basin Committee for user category j and k re-
spectively, and γijt is the share of tax payments to the Water Agency paid by
user category j. Unobserved heterogeneity specific to Water Agency i is cap-
tured by the individual effect αi, and εit is an i.i.d. random disturbance. Because
the proportion of representatives and/or the share of tax or subsidy is likely to
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be correlated with water agency-specific unobserved heterogeneity, a fixed effect
procedure is considered to avoid a possible endogeneity bias.
Since a significant proportion of RBC members are not likely to have a sig-
nificant role in the discussions over the distribution of subsidies, we consider two
measures of user-category representation in the RBCs. The first one is the pro-
portion of each category of users (agriculture, industry) with respect to the size
of the entire committee, and the second one is the proportion with respect to the
number of user representatives (agriculture, industry, tourism, fisheries, angling,
energy producers, etc.) in the RBC.
As agriculture was not subsidized by all Water Agencies at all time periods,
the dependent variable has some zero values for the agricultural sector. For this
reason, the model has to be estimated by a Tobit procedure to correct for this,
and produce consistent estimates in the case of agriculture. As far as industry
is concerned, the dependent variable is not censored, so that a linear regression
model is employed. Because the number of Water Agencies (6) is far lower than
the number of time periods, the issue of the incidental parameter is not serious
here, and fixed effects for Agencies can simply be added to the model to control
for river basin-specific unobserved heterogeneity. Parameter estimates would be
similar to the ones obtained from a Within procedure in the linear case.
Table 7 presents estimation results of the fixed-effect Tobit model for agricul-
tural subsidies (relative to the total budget). The share of agricultural represen-
tatives has the expected positive sign, and is significant, reflecting the ability of
this sector to collect more subsidies from the global WA budget when it is more
represented in th RBC. This effect holds, either in proportion of River Basin
Committee members, or in proportion of water user representatives in the RBC.
The share of industrial subsidies is negative and significant, as expected, illus-
trating the competition for subsidies between both sectors. On the other hand,
a surprising result is that the share of total tax revenues paid by agriculture is
negative and significant. This result means that, when controlling for the number
of agricultural representatives in the Committees, agriculture does not succeed
in compensating a higher tax burden by more subsidies.
Results for the share of subsidies granted to industry are presented in Table
8. In this case, the proportion of representatives from industries is not signifi-
cant, indicating that the simple use of this proportion is not sufficient to explain
increases in relative subsidies associated with this sector. On the other hand, the
share of tax revenues collected from industry is significant and has the expected
positive sign. The share of agricultural industrial subsidies is negative and signifi-
cant, as expected, illustrating the competition for subsidies between both sectors,
as was the case in Table 7 for agriculture. The conclusion to this reduced-form es-
timation is that the agricultural and industrial sectors experience heterogeneous
performance in obtaining a larger share of subsidies from the WA total budget.
While agriculture benefits from a larger number of representatives in River Basin
Committees, industry experiences a positive relationship between tax collected
31
Table 7: Fixed-effect Tobit parameter estimates. Dependent variable: proportion
of subsidies received by agriculture
Variable Estimate t-statistic Estimate t-statistic
Share of agriculture in committee 2.4582** 2.00 - -
Share of agricultural users - - 0.8861** 2.02
Share of industry in committee -0.0768 -0.10 - -
Share of industry users - - -0.1939 -0.77
Share of industrial subsidies -0.2206*** -4.38 -0.2197*** -4.38
Share of agricultural tax -1.6552** -2.03 -1.7905** -2.19
Intercept -0.035 -0.24 0.02552 0.20
Sigma 0.0410*** 13.08 0.0408*** 13.08
Log-L 148.47 148.8634
Notes. 95 observations, 8 censored at 0 and 87 uncensored. *, ** and ***
respectively indicates a parameter significant at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level.
Table 8: Fixed-effect parameter estimates. Dependent variable: proportion of
subsidies received by the industrial sector
Variable Estimate t-statistic Estimate t-statistic
Share of agriculture in committee -2.4498 -1.09 - -
Share of agricultural users - - -1.1541 -1.23
Share of industry in committee -0.1931 -0.14 - -
Share of industry users - - -0.3254 -0.66
Share of agricultural subsidies -0.5245** -2.56 -0.4923** -2.39
Share of industry tax 0.5906*** 3.00 0.6446*** 3.23
Intercept 0.2874 1.00 0.3613 1.53
Notes. 95 observations. *, ** and *** respectively indicates a parameter signifi-
cant at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level.
for water use and emissions, and subsidies from the WA total budget.
5 Discussion and Extensions
The objective of this section is to discuss several features and assumptions of our
model and to explore directions for extending or revising the model.
The model developed in this paper is based on a set of assumptions concerning
the functioning of water basin committees and the preferences of their members.
For the sake of illustration, consider the Adour-Garonne River Basin Committee.
It has now (as of 2012) n = 135 members divided into three colleges: a first college
of 54 members representing the local governments (local communities), a second
college of 54 members representing users and experts (professional bodies) and a
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third college of 27 members representing the central government (representatives
of the State and public boards). The first college is composed of representatives
from the regions, the de´partements (French districts), the large munipalities and
and the small municipalities (with a qualification for the municipalities located
in either mountain areas or seaside areas). The second college has 9 representives
from agriculture, 27 representives from the industry and 18 representives from
different associations (consumers, protection of the environment), regional Social
and Economic Councils and groups of experts. A key assumption of our paper is
that the interests among group users are conflictual and that the representatives
often act on behalf of a particular group. Of course it is not straightforward to
collect direct evidence supporting that assumption. A careful examination of the
proceedings reproducing the synthesis of the debates within the committee is a
first step in that direction.
The second critical assumption of this paper is the choice of the conflict di-
mension. In the empirical section, we have priviledged the case where the conflict
is between the three main groups of users. While there is clear evidence to sup-
port such assumption, we could have instead privileged the geographic dimension
of conflict. Indeed, each Water Agency is in charge of the various sub-river basins
within the broad hydrographical river basin, with local delegations for each. For
example, the Adour-Garonne WA has five such delegations, with permanent staff
dedicated to local water management issues. Instead of having k = 3 and a
dispute among users, we could instead consider k = 5 (or even a finer grid) and
consider a dispute among territories. In fact, the balanced composition of the
committee in terms of geographic areas may suggest that this characteristic is
important. In such case, our model would become closer to the seminal study
of Kauppi and Widgren (2004). Nevertheless, we woul have also to make some
assumptions on the preferences of those who are not affiliated to a specific area
as the members of the third college. We do not know if there are (as we observe
for users) cross subsidies across territories.
Some more theoretical assumptions may also be challenged. The model has
been developed under the assumption that players were perfectly patient and that
the rule used was the majority rule. It is important to investigate to which extent
our analysis could cover more general situations. Since the policy space is one
dimensional, even if the players are not perfectly patient, we deduce from Banks
and Duggan (2000) that for any voting rule, there exist non-delay stationnary
equilibria in pure strategies. Furthermore, by their continuity theorem, pure
strategy equilibrium outcomes converge to core outcomes when discount factors
converge to one. If the players are not perfectly patient, then the analysis of
equilibria is more intricate. Cho and Duggan10 (2003) have proved that in any
non-delay stationary equilibrium, the acceptance set is an interval. Cardona and
10They also prove uniqueness in the case where the utilities are quadratic and the voting
game is strong.
33
Ponsati (2011) have proved that under a strong condition on the utilities and if
the voting rule is anonymous and proper, then the equilibrium is unique.They also
analyse the impact of the quota on the social welfare. None of these conditions on
utilities are satisfied in our setting. However, Predtetchinski (2011) has proved
that when the discount rates tend to 1 then the approval set converges to a unique
asymptotic equilibrium outcome which is solution of a well defined equation. It
would be interesting to calculate this limit in our framework and to proceed to a
subsequent analysis of the social welfare attached to any of the possible quotas.
As a final point, let us remember that in this paper, our bargaining setting has
been described as a non-cooperative game. We could have instead, like Kauppi
and Widgren, adopted a cooperative framework. This would be quite relevant
in the case where geographic characteristics would be considered as the most
important dimension in the bargaining. In such case, it would be relevant to
define the game as a weigted majority game and to calculate the shapley value
of the game as Kauppi and Widgren did or other solutions like for instance the
nucleolus (Le Breton, Montero and Zaporozhets, 2012; Montero, 2006). Along
these lines, we could also consider any mix betwwen the “tax solution” γ and a
copperative bargaining solution.
Finally, concerning the empirical application, it is clear that results from a
reduced-form econometric procedure cannot confirm all the predictions of our
bargaining model. This is particularly true as the proportion of the “secured”
budget without bargaining (α) is a complex function of probabilities p, weights w
and initial tax shares γ, with does not in general has a closed-form solution. Given
the complexity of the optimal solutions from the model of bargaining, structural
econometrics would be needed to identify risk preferences and deal adequately
with unobserved weights w. This is left for future research.
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6 Appendix
6.1 Interior Regimes
In the case where we are not in a corner regime i.e. when a representative puts
positive weights on several groups of users, things become a bit more complicated
from an analytical perspective. Note hovewer that the problem is well defined
as under the assumption that ui is concave for all i = 1, ..., k the sets S
l
α ≡
{x ∈ Sα : ul (αγ + xj) ≥ ul (γ)} are convex for all l = 1, ..., n. The problem of
the proposer is:
Max
xj∈Rk+
vj
(
xj
) ≡ uj (αγ + xj)
subject to the constraints
xj ∈ ∪
S∈Wm
∩
l∈S
Slα
Since uj is concave and ∩
l∈S
Slα is convex and non-empty, the set of solutions of
the above problem for a fixed S ∈ Wm is convex. It is not necessarily a singleton.
There are however specific situations where there is a unique solution. This is
for instance the case when uj is strictly concave. When the functions uj are
differentiable, the Kuhn-Tucker conditions describing a solution write:
βji u
′
i(xi) = λ−
∑
l∈S
µlβliu
′
i(xi)− θi for all i = 1, ..., k
where the Lagrange multipliers λ, θi for all i = 1, ..., k and µ
l for all l ∈ S are
non negative. It simplifies to:
u′i(xi) =
λ− θi
βji +
∑
l∈S µ
lβli
for all i = 1, ..., k
If xi > 0 for all i = 1, ..., k, then we obtain:
u′i(xi) =
λ
βji +
∑
l∈S µ
lβli
for all i = 1, ..., k
To solve explicitely the equations, we need to identify which participation
constraints l ∈ S are active and which ones are not.
6.2 Incomplete Information
In our analysis of the corner regime, we have assumed that the type βl of each
voter l is common knowledge. While reasonable when l represents explicitely a
well defined group of users, it is less so when it is not the case. If βl is private
information for each voter l =k+1, ..., n, then we introduce adverse selection into
our framework. To each offer xj made by proposer j is now attached a vector
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of probabilities pi (xj) =
(
pil (xj)
)
1≤l≤n where pi
l (xj) denotes the probability that
voter l accepts the offer. The probability that the offer xj is accepted is equal to:
P
(
xj
)
=
∑
S∈W
(∏
l∈S
pil
(
xj
))(∏
l /∈S
(1− pil (xj)))
The expected utility of the proposer is then :
P
(
xj
)
vj
(
xj
)
+ (1− P (xj))vj (γ)
His objective is to maximize that function under the constraint that xj ∈ Sα.
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